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A Clash of Methodology and Ethics
in “Undercover” Social Science
C. D. HERRERA
Montclair State University

A focus of criticism on methodological and ethical grounds, the undercover or
“covert” approach to fieldwork persists as a useful technique in certain settings.
Questions remain about the credibility of the published findings from such
work. Covert researchers nearly always protect the anonymity of their subjects
and locations. Other researchers cannot validate the covert researcher’s claims,
yet ethical guidelines often insist that researchers demonstrate the benefits that
derive from a covert study. If researchers cannot show that their studies will
prove beneficial, ethical standards will weigh against the study, on the presumption that the omission of informed consent should be counterbalanced by the scientific rewards of the research. An attempt to open the results to greater peer
investigation might place subjects at risk of unwanted notoriety or even danger.
There does not seem to be a way that covert research can meet ethical guidelines
unless we adjust our conceptions of research, ethics, or both.
Keywords: fieldwork; ethnography; research ethics; informed consent

1. GOING UNDERCOVER AMONG THE “NATIVES”
The undercover, covert approach in fieldwork has weathered ethical criticism over the years (Bulmer 1982; Hilbert 1980). Yet it remains
a method of choice for social scientists who fear that by openly
announcing their intentions, they will cause potential subjects to
scurry. The covert approach is also useful when social scientists cannot directly ask people to fill in a form and expect candid, meaningful
responses or when gathering information on critical issues such as
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health care (e.g., Van Der Geest and Sarkodie 1998) or observing highrisk behavior such as police work.
A widely known example is Rosenhan’s (1973) field study in a
mental hospital. Rosenhan and his assistants cooked up stories about
hearing voices and other “schizophrenic” symptoms. The group then
tricked hospital staff into admitting them as patients. As “pseudopatients,” these social scientists recorded observational data on the
care that genuine patients were receiving. Rosenhan later wrote of
spurious diagnoses and potential abuses of institutional power. He
also reported that the genuine patients saw through the disguises,
whereas the staff treated (or mistreated) them as insane, referring to
them as such.
This is likely as exciting and romantic as social science can get.
Stories of undercover observation like this do not elicit the yawns that
lengthy accounts of statistical measures or debates about Grand Theory building might. Not only that, in a world accustomed to exposés
from TV journalists, along with “sting” operations in law enforcement, going undercover in covert social science appears to be the way
to study some human behavior when results count.

2. AN ETHICAL RESTRAINT ON
METHODS AND CREDIBILITY
The question is, does research like this really add to our store of
knowledge or does it provide only for interesting reading? My own
doubts are based on a vaguely felt intellectual or scientific obligation.
I cannot shake the feeling that we should accept stories like
Rosenhan’s only on sufficient evidence.1 I do not suggest that
researchers are lying to readers, only that they can make honest mistakes about reporting and interpretation. Unfortunately, data from
this kind of research is suspect. Rosenhan was not supposed to be
where he alleges that he was, much less doing what he alleges that he
did.
One might think that covert researchers could evade this whiff of
suspicion by providing verifiable information about their research. If
undercover fieldworkers would let on more about who they talked to,
who they watched, what criteria defined key terms or parameters,
and so on, it would help reduce skepticism. It would help fieldwork
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reports seem less like the social science version of the Cold Fusion
announcements a few years back in physics.
The trouble is, ethical standards generally will not let social scientists do this. Ethical standards vary, but it is safe to say that they nearly
always prohibit social scientists from publishing the names of the
people or places that they observe (e.g., Cassell 1978). As such, the
standards will not let undercover researchers present a clear trail that
others might follow to double-check factual assertions. This is true
even in social science that is aboveboard, where researchers identify
themselves and seek the informed consent of those they talk to. But
the problem is more acute where researchers go undercover. Covert
researchers usually sidestep informed-consent routines on the promise that their studies will not place subjects at great risk, mainly the
risk of recognition, and that the data they seek is unobtainable otherwise. In effect, social scientists win over the local ethics Review Board
by promising to safeguard data during the research and possibly
destroy the data afterward.2 And like most fieldworkers, covert
researchers work to prevent anyone from identifying the subjects or
locales described in the research by using fictionalized descriptions
and portraying John and Jane Does in published reports.
What makes for good ethics does not always make for good science
(and vice versa). The practice of ethnographic cloaking represents a
gain for everyone but the critic interested in scientific peer review. As
Hicks (1977) concedes, “When we fail to locate our subjects of study
precisely, we are implicitly arguing that the interpretation we propose
is the only valid one possible” (p. 218). The peer-review system relies
on the open dissemination of findings. In theory, at any rate, this is
supposed to enable subsequent researchers to replicate and verify
these findings. The hope, of course, is that a properly working system
will weed out false or exaggerated claims.3 Since reports of covert
research are not, strictly speaking, about the people we read of, social
scientists have no way to verify claims about them. This might be a
problem of some import, given that social science often bears on public policy decisions. Later research can investigate similar problems,
yet it cannot test new results against identifiable points of reference.
Clearly, should these follow-on studies themselves be covert, the process will never lead to a sharing of actual results with scientific peers
or anyone else for that matter.
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3. MAKING GOOD ON THE
METHODOLOGICAL PROMISE
This matter has ethical, not merely epistemic, relevance. Inviting
the scrutiny of data is an essential part of validating claims in a study.
The same scrutiny is essential in determining the ethical status of that
study, since a widely held principle holds that no subject should be
involved in trivial or poorly conceived research.4 This principle oversight committees generally take to mean that research should hold the
prospect of valuable results. Here, too, we are talking about problems
that arise with any approach to fieldwork but that are given special
urgency where covert studies are concerned. This is because the
assumption is that the subjects of undercover fieldwork would object
to being studied or would prefer some control over the terms of any
observation. Studying them without first asking is therefore rightly
seen as an imposition on their privacy or autonomy (Sagarin 1973).
Hence, research protocols are expected to show that any imposition
on the subjects will be offset by the scientific benefits of the study. This
is of less concern where subjects can themselves weigh this imposition, as they can in a noncovert study. If a judgment about scientific
value hinges on social scientists being able to follow through on these
claims about benefits from covert fieldwork, in contrast, and ethical
principles prevent social scientists from doing this, there seems no
clear way to talk of justifying such research.
With covert studies in ethical and methodological limbo, any purported findings must be taken with a liberal dose of salt. The same
qualification would thus apply to claims of having involved the subjects in an ethical study. The problem is not merely that I cannot be
sure that anything was proven or demonstrated. How can I be sure
that subjects were not taken advantage of in what amounted to a mere
poking around in someone’s attic? I can see where there might be a
natural temptation to smooth over this clash of credibility and ethical
consideration:
Simple pseudonyms, provided they are not mistaken for real names,
merely diminish rather than distort the data. But when quantities are
rounded, and details of time and place altered in such a way that the
reader cannot tell how much is genuine and how much is disguise, the
scientist is presenting his data in distorted form. His obligation as a scientist is to make sure that the distortions are insignificant, while his
duty to the citizens is to ensure that the distortions constitute an adequate disguise. (Barnes 1979, p. 139)
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I am less confident that we know what methodological price is paid
by disguising people and events. Nor does it seem right to overlook
the difficulty in knowing what counts as a “significant” distortion of
the data. The idea seems to be that all concerned can abide by a kind of
Gentlemen’s Agreement, one that forbids the asking of delicate questions about proof or factual accuracy. In other words, we might suppose that the business of fieldwork is best guided by an understanding that this is clandestine research, and we are not allowed to peek
behind the curtain.
These ideas do not inspire the degree of confidence that one associates with science, however. As far back as 1937, a critic writing on field
methods pointed out the obvious: “An explanation does not necessarily look less plausible if the event which is explained has not
occurred” (Kuczynski 1937, xiii; see also Barnes 1990). This seems the
appropriately skeptical stance. When research cannot meet a reasonable standard of verification, observational data are reduced to anecdote, at best, and the subjects will seem to have participated in
research of dubious scientific value. Without knowing the effect that
disguises and distortions have on the credibility of a given study, it is
irresponsible to assert that it was beneficial or ethical.
It also seems to matter that covert researchers choose at the outset
not to seek informed consent. Social scientists decide in the planning
stage to gather information that they can share only after they launder
it through pseudonyms and other textual disguises.5 I am not questioning the need to protect those unknowingly carried along in covert
social science. This effort to shield people from unwanted notoriety is
commendable and, ethically speaking, not a great deal to ask for. If
you must involve me in work for your dissertation, without informing me or asking how I feel about this, the least you can do is prevent
me from becoming (in)famous.
But how would the scientific community ever truly know what
was done to or with the subjects of such research? Researchers who
realize that they will not be held to a truth-in-reporting rule are hardpressed to convince anyone that the study did not waste the subjects’
time or create extraordinary risks. And this is setting aside the doubts
regarding whether this or that observation fits in with a particular
theory of social reality, a consideration that one presumes is at least
partly behind the observation. Indeed, there may be incentive,
whether consciously acknowledged or not, for social scientists to alter
details so that their work appears that much more innocuous and
valuable to all concerned.
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This last point deserves emphasis, since it too relates to additional
ethical concerns. Covert researchers often describe acts of violence or
serious risks to subjects in the field. This is partly what makes for the
romantic-sounding exploits. But it is problematic that we cannot be
sure if the social scientists have told us everything when they recount
stories of subjects in harm’s way. When this happens, fieldworkers
must decide in a matter of seconds whether to intervene, continue to
observe, or both. Taylor (1987) conducted fieldwork in a mental institution, for example. While he observed there, Taylor writes, hospital
staff would occasionally torture various patients. Taylor watched as
they burned patients with lit cigarettes. Other staff members forced
patients into demeaning sex acts. At times, the torturers seemed eager
for a response from Taylor, who voiced no objections.6
Taylor was not undercover, but another fieldworker who joined a
rugby team was. As an undercover player-researcher, he found himself one night in a bar with his teammates. The researcher watched as
they selected a female patron to serve as their “rugby queen” (Schacht
1997). Amid loud singing, the atmosphere soon turned threatening,
and the lone woman was “hoisted onto one of the rugby player’s
shoulders.” We learn that she became, “with each verse . . . more visibly upset. She made several attempts to get off the player’s shoulders,
but with the assistance of the other players, he kept her squarely in
place” (pp. 339-40). The woman grew more frightened. As song
turned to insult, “players chanted ‘show us your tits’” (p. 340). The
fieldworker had seen a previous rugby queen “‘willingly’ comply
with this chant by flashing . . . her breasts as a means of stopping the
song” (p. 340). This time the inductee was spared that degradation,
although we learn that she cried for several minutes after freeing herself and then rushed from the pub alone. By then, the fieldworker continues, “everyone, except the rugby queen, went on with the party as
if nothing wrong had occurred” (p. 340).
While he admits to having had an idea of where the procession was
headed, the fieldworker did not intervene. “Part of me wanted to stop
what was being done to this woman,” he maintains. “If, on the other
hand, I had personally done anything to stop this ritual, I would have
not only put my membership role in this setting in jeopardy,
but . . . attempts on my part would have been futile with a group of
large drunken men” (p. 340). This type of situation, and the dilemma
of intervention that goes along with it, is common in all fieldwork. But
like the problem of verification, which also arises in all fieldwork, the
poignancy of details surrounding intervention is increased where the
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researchers go undercover. Noncovert, open research is not justified
so heavily on the promise that valuable results will flow from it or on
the promise that the researcher will control and minimize risks to the
subjects.
Fieldworkers who have been undercover sometimes try to verify
details by getting a subject’s perspective (see, e.g., Ely 1991) and integrating this into their ethnographic reports. A social scientist who had
been undercover might come clean in the end and share drafts of the
report among those studied. This might let researchers double-check
the relevant details with the subjects. The central issue is still the level
of detail that the rest of us read in the published report. Asking some
of the subjects for their views on information obtained might increase
the validity of the data if researchers could conduct follow-up
research on their responses.7 Letting the subjects speak for themselves, though this might seem ethically preferable, would also raise
questions about the supposed necessity of the covert approach in the
first place. The use of a covert study to suggest areas for additional
research could retroactively increase the study’s value, yet this could
come too late to offset the imposition on the subjects of the original
study. How many follow-on studies would be required to so “compensate” the subjects of the first one?

4. IS VERIFICATION OVERRATED?
Too often, remarks about verification in social science are dismissed as being unduly “positivistic.” This is an illicit move. Perhaps
too many social scientists were in the past bullied by critics because
they could not offer claims as logically or epistemically verifiable as
those of the physicists. But verification has never been a measure
applicable only to positivistic thinking. There has never been a genuine need or way to hold fieldwork to a harsh positivistic standard
(Flyvbjerg 2001). That kind of standard is unnecessary because there
are shades of validity appropriate for each branch of inquiry and a
commensurate degree of potential verification (Jorgensen 1989; Holstein 1992). In short, no one is asking that fieldworkers emulate
physicists.
What would count as sufficient verification or reliability is hard to
say. It might be that the appropriate degree of detail would be that
which lends credibility to claims made in the field study. Social scientists might need to show that their findings are relevant or meaningful
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in light of some social application (see Hammersley 1992) or relevant
to the interests of the subjects. Overall, minimal criteria could apply
when judging the value of a study or the findings from it. I cannot
help but think that there is an economic-sounding ethical tradeoff
here somewhere. This would have covert research having only to provide a standard for proof that covers the costs of involving subjects
without their consent. It cannot be denied that this conceptual relationship is cyclical. The difficulty in knowing where to draw the line
arises from the fact that we rarely, if ever, have reliable information
about the risks that subjects did or did not take. We therefore do not
know what level of off-setting scientific benefit is called for. Still, some
attempt must be made to provide a clearer account of the costs and
benefits involved.
Of course, the conflict that I am describing between principles only
arises if fieldwork qualifies as science. Remove the labels of “science”
or “research,” the argument might go, and one removes the need to
protect those written about. One might even reduce the need to obtain
ethics review. If fieldworkers are in turn not accountable for what
happens to the people they observe, they might not feel compelled to
disguise names or places. Fieldworkers might then attain some measure of verifiability for their claims, albeit at the expense of those
observed. By the same token, if no pretense toward traditional scientific discourse is made, there is no room to hold the ethnographer’s
feet to the fire when it comes to truth in reporting.
Setting aside the ethical issues this would raise, we are left to
explain what does take place when people are observed in a systematic, organized way that will culminate in public reporting in scholarly journals, if it is not scientific research. Candidate descriptions
might include oral history, journalism, autobiography, and espionage. If ethnography is understood to be quasi-fictional, there would
be less attention on what happened (or did not) in the field and to the
subjects. But it is customary for educated readers to associate
“research” with things like journalism or autobiographical studies
anyway, so the fact that anthropologists might claim to be doing
something other than science probably will not remove all impressions that research is taking place with human subjects. In addition,
sociologists who gather data in a hospital, for instance, will surely
strike many people as engaging in health care–related research, especially if the work appears to have scientific application (Charmaz and
Olesen 1997). A project that involves gathering what could be con-
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strued as “data” in a workplace is understandably going to strike people as occupational “research,” regardless of the disciplinary disclaimers that those who conduct it might offer, and so on. Reports of
such inquiries will also seem consistent with the type of information
that people are used to reading in scientific literature (Rosenhan’s
1973 undercover study did show up in the journal Science, after all).
In the end, it is hard to avoid the intuition that covert researchers at
least set out to produce something of scientific merit. Equally strong is
the intuition that so long as this is research, broadly defined, it should
be able to meet reasonable ethical standards. Here I have in mind not
only standards that pertain to the subjects but those that guide interaction between scientists and the larger society. And it might be in that
context that the need to know truth from its alternatives is grounded
in a larger ethical need. Schwalbe (1996) considers the prospect that
ethnographers and others might be free to use a variety of written
forms, including postmodernish sounding poetic or exploratory
styles, to be an abrogation of responsibility, however trendy it might
be. There are those who would say, for instance, that the ethnographer
“creates an interpretive world” and should be free to put a creative
twist into the reporting. Schwalbe contends that this is a “catchy slogan for textual idealists whose worlds consist largely of academic discourse, but it’s not a useful mission statement. There are people living
and dying out there in worlds there not created at anyone’s keyboard. . . . It is our job to find out what’s happening in those worlds,
and then tell about it as clearly and with much sociological insight as
we can” (p. 539). It is difficult to improve upon this, if one is committed to the idea that covert research is intended to reveal something of
social and scientific relevance to those who do not or will not go
undercover.

5. CLOSING THOUGHTS ON SCIENTIFIC
AND ETHICAL THRESHOLDS
All of this suggests that something must give. Even the best known
examples of the covert approach to social science illustrate an interesting problem at the convergence of research ethics, epistemology, and
philosophy of science. If I am right, the brunt of this problem resides
at the linkage between ethics and methods, and this should direct our
attention to the need to reassess what qualifies as research and reex-
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amine disciplinary and ethical boundaries. On one hand, there might
be something to the claim that academic social scientists are held to
excessively strict ethical standards. Journalists observe people who
have not consented, and they take their chances when it comes to the
hazards this might involve. On the other hand, beliefs about what
risks or benefits are, along with the urge to protect people in research,
derive from attitudes about proper behavior within specific disciplinary boundaries. Whether on legitimate grounds or not, we simply
expect more from the professor down the hall.
In that respect, fieldworkers who carry on like researchers will be
expected to meet scientific guidelines for methods and ethical treatment of the subjects. And it may not comfort anyone to hear that social
scientists have avoided an ethical problem by adopting the methods
of journalists. It would be premature to conclude that in this clash of
methods and morals, the latter must bend. Some attempt must be
made to adjust our standards so that science remains “good” in the
dual sense of being epistemically robust and considerate of the people
who, after all, are not given the choice of whether to participate in the
social scientist’s project.

NOTES
1. By implication, we might also want to reserve judgment until we know that the
subjects in the study were truthful with the researcher or were not acting with motives
that they concealed from the researcher. This problem bears on the value we can assign
to a study (Miles 1983; Dean and Whyte 1958), but I will not address it here.
2. Researchers occasionally wish that they had destroyed the data sooner (Brujaha
and Hallowell 1986; Scarce 1994).
3. There are critics who allege that in some varieties of fieldwork, notably “interpretive anthropology,” the researchers veer so far from credibility with their descriptions
of people and events that there are ethical questions raised about whether the subjects
are told that they will be portrayed in such a far-fetched way. For an overview of this
problem, see Jones (1998).
4. Credit for elaborating this principle of research ethics is usually given to Charles
Fried (1974). The spirit behind this principle dates to the discussions of research ethics
that followed the Nuremberg Trials in 1945.
5. On the additional problems that researchers must overcome when collecting data
this way, see Fountain (1993) and Shulman (1994).
6. Taylor (1987) explains that his intent was to remain passive so that he could gather
additional data on this and similar institutions.
7. The sharing of the prepublication information also raises ethical issues unrelated
to verification (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983).
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